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This study examines how digital repositories with a 
preservation mandate are engaging in disaster planning, 
particularly in relation to their pursuit of trusted digital 
repository status. For those that are engaging in disaster 
planning, the study examines the creation of formal disaster 
response and recovery plans. Findings indicate that the 
process of going through an audit for certification as a 
trusted repository provides the incentive needed for the 
creation of formalized disaster planning documentation, and 
that repositories struggle with making their documentation 
available.  This study also finds several significant 
obstacles with regard to the creation of formal disaster 
planning documentation, including the efforts required to 
get buy-in from different functional areas within the 
organization, difficulty collaborating with the IT 
department, and the amount of time required for completion 
of the documentation.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Disaster response and recovery planning remains one of the 
most important components of a preservation program in 
digital repositories. It is also one of the least understood and 
transparent.  The adoption of standards and models for 
preservation, such as ISO 16363: 2012, the Space Data and 
Information Transfer Systems — Audit and Certification of 
Trustworthy Digital Repositories (2012) and ISO 
14721:2012, the Open Archival Information System 
(OAIS) model have helped to clarify and illuminate best 
practices for disaster response and recovery in the digital 
preservation community.  However, our understanding of 
disaster planning for digital repositories remains limited, 
both in terms of what constitutes disaster planning activities 
as well as whether any best practices have emerged in 
planning for different types of risk. 
In terms of storage, “2007 marked the ‘crossover’ year in 
which more digital data was created than there is data 
storage to host it” (Berman, 2008).  This tipping point, the 
point at which data created outpaced our capacity to store it, 
was significant for the digital preservation community.  It 
was at this point when decision making for digital 
preservation needed to focus not only on how to preserve 
data, but also on what to preserve. 
These decisions are based on any number of criteria, but the 
important factor to consider for digital preservation and 
disaster planning is that the information selected for 
preservation in digital repositories has ultimately been 
selected because of its value, “re-creating research data sets 
can be prohibitively expensive; in the extreme, it may be 
impossible to re-create lost data” (Beagrie, Chruszcz, & 
Lavoie, 2008, p. 16).  The importance and uniqueness of 
research data, compounded with the difficulty or 
impossibility of recreating lost data, makes a strong case for 
preservation.  Because of this need to preserve the data that 
is held in digital repositories, disaster planning is a 
particularly important activity. The digital preservation 
community is developing an awareness and understanding 
of the concept of disaster planning as part of a digital 
preservation program (Gracy & Kahn, 2012), but a 
thorough understanding of disaster planning in practice has 
not yet been achieved. 
This study is driven by the following research questions:  
1. What motivates the disaster planning activities in 
digital repositories? 
2. What is the scope of disaster plans for digital 
repositories? 
3. Does the pursuit of trusted digital repository status 
affect disaster planning activities?  
In this pilot study, we concentrate on the disaster planning 
practices of digital repositories that have either sought 
trusted repository status, have undergone some type of self-
audit, or have expressed a commitment to pursuing this type 
of certification process in the future.  The study consists of 
10 interviews with individuals from 8 different 
organizations.  As the literature indicates, disaster planning 
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is generally understood to be part of the requirements for 
trusted repository status, but the details of such planning 
activities are not well documented or understood 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012; 
Innocenti & Vullo, 2009; McHugh, Ross, Innocenti, 




In order to understand disaster planning for digital 
repositories, it is important to first examine digital 
preservation and the relationship of preservation to disaster 
planning. Disaster planning emerged in the analog era, but 
has become vital in the digital era (Aikin, 2007; Cervone, 
2006; Muir & Shenton, 2002; Myles, 2000).  Digital 
preservation consists of actions that ensure the viability and 
authenticity of digital objects over time and disaster 
planning is one of those actions (Berman, 2008).  Disaster 
planning or preparedness in a traditional sense “refers to a 
state or situation of the libraries in which they are well 
prepared to prevent severe library damage from potential 
disasters” (Wong & Green, 2006).  More specifically, a 
disaster plan is a document that describes policies and 
procedures that have been created to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from a disaster (Muir & Shenton, 
2002).  Beyond this, nothing is written on disaster planning 
for digital repositories. A majority of the evidence we have 
for this activity are copies of digital disaster plans on the 
web (e.g., Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (ICPSR), 2013). 
Some approaches to digital preservation, such as the 
LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keeps Stuff Safe) system, have 
implicit disaster planning strategies built in. While it is 
often not directly stated, the ‘lots of copies’ part of a 
LOCKSS system is, in effect, meant to preserve the data 
that may suffer a disaster at one location by duplication 
across many different sites. Articles, such as those by 
Maniatis et al. (2005), highlight the strength of a LOCKSS 
network to resist “attack” and “random storage faults,” both 
of which can be considered disaster events (Maniatis, 
Roussopoulos, Giuli, Rosenthal, & Baker, 2005).  In a study 
published in 2007, Schroeder and Gibson (2007) conducted 
a survey that suggested that the random storage faults 
discussed by Maniatis et al. are indeed likely to occur.  
However, these articles do not focus specifically on what 
types of disaster responses are needed to guard against 
these faults or how recovery planning should occur when 
they are detected. Instead, these two articles imply that 
disaster response and recovery planning are not needed – if 
implemented properly the duplication for long-term 
preservation will allow the system to overcome any type of 
disruption or loss in service.   
Another approach to digital preservation is the Integrated 
Rule Oriented Data Systems (iRODS) software that has 
been developed by the Data Intensive Cyber Environments 
group (DICE).  iRODS is “a second generation data grid 
system that facilitates data management spanning large 
geographic areas and across administrative domains” (Data 
Intensive Cyber Environments Group, 2008).  The iRODS 
system is not specifically a preservation system, but it can 
be used to facilitate and support preservation by mitigating 
against the risk of disaster because it allows repositories to 
create and enforce rules and policies, therefore ensuring 
consistency within the repository (Rajasekar et al., 2010). 
Digital Curation 
Digital curation involves assessing value for collections and 
implies some type of value proposition. According to 
Walters and Skinner (2007), “digital curation refers to the 
actions people take to maintain and add value to digital 
information over its lifecycle, including the processes used 
when creating digital content” (Skinner, 2006).  
Susceptibility to disasters is a problem not only if it 
interrupts access to collections, but also if it threatens the 
integrity of those valued collections, whether they are 
needed for one year or twenty. 
Trust 
Another important element of preservation and disaster 
preparedness for digital repositories is the concept of trust.  
Garrett and Waters (1996) make the claim that, “for 
assuring the longevity of information, perhaps the most 
important role in the operation of a digital archives is 
managing the identity, integrity and quality of the archives 
itself as a trusted source of the cultural record” (Garrett & 
Waters, 1996).  
The concept of trust has emerged in community standards 
for digital repositories. Through the granting of trusted 
digital repository status, repositories are deemed 
trustworthy, and part of that designation involves evidence 
of disaster planning and response activities and 
documentation. Several mechanisms through which 
repositories can gain trusted status are: Trustworthy 
Repositories Audit & Certification (TRAC): Criteria and 
Checklist (ISO 16363); Digital Repository Audit Method 
Based on Risk Assessment (DRAMBORA) which was 
developed jointly by the Digital Curation Centre and 
DigitalPreservation Europe; Data Seal of Approval (DSA), 
which originated in the Netherlands, and Network of 
Expertise in Long-Term Storage and Long-Term 
availability of Digital Resources (nestor), the German 
competence network for digital preservation. 
Disaster planning is a core construct of the TRAC 
requirements. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are most explicit, “the 
repository shall have suitable written disaster preparedness 
and recovery plan(s)” (Consultative Committee for Space 
Data Systems, 2012)  TRAC certification requires that the 
repository be able to demonstrate disaster preparedness.  
This preparedness is generally demonstrated through the 
creation of a disaster plan or, more accurately, a suite of 
disaster planning documents. In fact, two of the four 
certified repositories, Chronopolis and HathiTrust, had to 
specifically create disaster plans to gain certification.  
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The focus on risk in the DRAMBORA assessment can 
arguably be seen as analogous to the TRAC requirement for 
disaster preparedness as both seek to mitigate the risk that 
disasters pose to digital repositories. The DRAMBORA 
assessment, in fact, has a stronger focus on risk 
management and mitigation as the entire assessment is 
based on a repository’s ability to assess, manage, and 
respond to risks.  In both cases, there is a strong emphasis 
on preparation for and the ability to respond to disasters. 
The Data Seal of Approval (DSA) is an assessment 
consisting of sixteen guidelines, which “recognize that 
responsibility for archival quality data is shared amongst 
three groups: producers for the quality of the research data 
themselves, the repository for the quality of data storage 
and availability, and consumers for the quality of data use” 
(Ball, 2010).  While disaster planning and risk management 
are not explicitly discussed, the focus on digital archiving, 
long-term preservation, and lifecycle management are 
relevant to disaster planning. 
The German nestor project is a competence network that 
has produced a catalog of criteria for trusted digital 
repositories (nestor Working Group Trusted Repositories - 
Certification, 2009).  This listing of criteria specifies that 
repositories should be prepared to address and respond to 
risks, but does not specifically state that the repository 
should have a disaster plan. 
Key differences exist between TRAC, DSA, nestor, and 
DRAMBORA: TRAC and DSA provide strict guidelines 
for performing an audit; nestor provides a listing of criteria 
for trusted repositories; and DRAMBORA provides a 
framework that can be adapted to fit the needs of any 
repository (Ball, 2010; Center for Research Libraries, 2007; 
Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS), 2010; 
Dobratz, Schoger, & Strathmann, 2007; nestor Working 
Group Trusted Repositories - Certification, 2009; Patel, 
2007).  Despite differences in philosophy and degree of 
formality, TRAC, DSA, nestor, and DRAMBORA all 
specifically include requirements for repositories to have 
disaster planning and risk management documentation 
(Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS), 2010; 
McHugh et al., 2008; Ross & McHugh, 2006)  
Planning for Disasters 
Disaster planning, disaster mitigation, and risk management 
activities arise from real and imagined threats to collections 
(Aikin, 2007; Altman et al., 2009; Anderson, 2005; 
Cervone, 2006; Maniatis et al., 2005).  These threats can be 
divided into four broad categories: 
Physical threats result from chance, natural 
events, or age, and include failures in media, 
hardware, storage facilities, and so forth. 
Technological threats include format 
obsolescence and destructive software errors. 
Human threats include curatorial error, and 
insider and outsider attacks. Institutional threats 
include mission change, change of legal regime, 
or economic failure (Altman et al., 2009). 
Disaster planning documents for digital repositories tend to 
assume that disasters, large and small, will occur and that 
the organization will have to recover. While a certain 
amount of prevention can be helpful, there are some types 
of disasters that are outside of the control or influence of 
the repository and for these types of disasters repositories 
must do what they can to mitigate data loss (Anderson, 
2005; McDonald & Walters, 2010).  In anticipation of the 
need to recover from data loss, repositories are moving 
toward the widespread adoption of best practices for 
preservation. These best practices also contribute to the 
granting of trusted repository status as described above with 
TRAC, DSA, nestor, and DRAMBORA certifications.   
Literature discussing disaster planning for digital 
repositories is sparse, and as such discussion is necessarily 
limited (Anderson, 2005).  However, the general trends 
discussed above, and the recognition by the community that 
disaster planning is a beneficial and recommended action 
for digital repositories, are promising and suggest that this 
is an area that will continue to expand. 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this study involves semi-structured 
interviews to examine the disaster response and recovery 
planning practices of digital repositories. 
This study was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board 
at the University of Michigan and was granted “Not 
Regulated” status. 
Selection of Sites 
The sample population for this study consisted of digital 
repositories that have taken some steps toward trusted 
repository status, have conducted a TRAC, DRAMBORA, 
or DSA self-audit (and made the results of this audit 
publicly available), or have expressed a commitment to 
pursuing this type of certification process in the future.  The 
initial list of 19 repositories was created in May of 2011, 
based on information available at that time.  Eight were 
selected for inclusion in the final study based on their 
availability and the willingness of individuals at those 
organizations to be interviewed. All who were able to 
complete an interview by the end of January 2012 were 
included in the study.   
Interviews 
Interview subjects were identified at each of the initial 19 
organizations and were selected for inclusion in this study 
based on information available on the repositories’ websites 
indicating that they are responsible for, or involved in, 
disaster response and recovery planning activities or digital 
preservation activities.  Individuals at these organizations 
were contacted via email, with a second follow-up message 
sent to those who did not respond to the first email.  A total 
of 21 responses were received, and ten individuals were 
ultimately selected for participation. 
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Of the ten subjects interviewed for the study, three hold 
administrative roles, five digital preservation roles, and two 
positions in information technology (IT).  As the analysis 
will show, these roles are significant in that the subjects 
hold varying amounts of responsibility and authority within 
their organizations. Each also plays a different role in 
disaster planning activities within their respective 
organization. 
Participants were sent consent forms to review and sign 
prior to the interview.  Interviews lasted approximately one 
hour each and were conducted via telephone or in person.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
The interviews followed a semi-structured list of questions, 
which allowed for modification to the wording and/or order 
of the questions.  This also allowed for further probing and 
requests for elaboration to clarify the subjects’ responses 
where necessary (Babbie, 2010; Robson, 1993; Wildemuth, 
2009).  Questions covered the areas of: organizational 
attitudes toward disaster response and recovery planning, 
development of, access to, use, and maintenance of disaster 
planning documentation, and budgetary considerations.  
Code Repository Role 
Subject A Chronopolis Digital Preservation 
Subject B Chronopolis Digital Preservation 
Subject C HathiTrust IT 
Subject D HathiTrust Digital Preservation 
Subject E ICPSR Digital Preservation  
Subject F MATRIX IT 
Subject G National Library of Australia Digital Preservation 
Subject H Portico Administration 






Table 1: Repositories and Interview Subjects. 
 
Interview Analysis 
Once completed, the interviews were transcribed and 
coded. The system for coding was developed based on a 
review of the literature, a preliminary review of the 
websites and available documentation, and initial 
impressions from the interviews themselves (Holsti, 1969; 
Wildemuth, 2009).  Thus, the coding scheme was both 
grounded or bottom up, arising from the interviews 
themselves and top down based on themes in the literature. 
Codes fell into general categories of communication, 
documentation, administration, and preservation. In all 
instances, the first round of coding was descriptive. More 
interpretative and pattern analysis was done in a second 
round of examination once the initial coding has been 
completed. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations of this study.  First, the small 
population size makes it difficult to draw conclusions that 
could be generalized to a larger population.  This limited 
scope is partly a result of the small number of repositories 
that have engaged in trusted repository audits.  Second, 
speaking to only one or two individuals at each repository 
does not provide a complete picture of the entire lifecycle 
of the disaster planning process.  Third, the sample did not 
represent diverse repositories. Of the final eight repositories 
included in this study, one is a national library, one is an 
institutional repository, and the rest are nonprofit 
organizations with varying degrees of affiliation with 
academic institutions.   
FINDINGS 
The coded interview data yields findings in the following 
three areas: 
1. Incentives for Creation of a Disaster Response and 
Recovery Plan 
 
2. Disaster Response and Recovery Plan 
Documentation  
 
3. Process of Creation of a Disaster Response and 
Recovery Plan, Including Obstacles 
Incentive for Creation of a Disaster Response and 
Recovery Plan 
Many of the subjects claimed that disaster planning 
activities occurred as a result of the organization’s growth 
and development. However, even those who insisted that 
their repository had disaster planning policies and 
procedures in place indicated that it was in response to the 
requirements of the certification process that they created 
formal disaster response and recovery planning documents.   
Most of the interviewees from organizations that have 
received certification as a trustworthy digital repository (i.e. 
Chronopolis, HathiTrust, and Portico) specifically stated 
that formal disaster planning documentation had been 
created for the audit.   As Subject A from Chronopolis 
stated, “it [the TRAC audit] really did push us to create a 
lot of documentation and to be very explicit about things 
that we had just kind of assumed before or that we hadn’t 
put into place or had language for.”  Interviewees from 
HathiTrust indicated that they were in the process of 
creating formal disaster planning documentation as required 
by their previous TRAC audit, and expected to have it 
completed for their next certification review. 
Similarly, Subject J from The MetaArchive Cooperative 
stated that disaster planning policies and procedures had 
been in place prior to the audit, “I would say in some ways 
the disaster planning action has been in place since 2004, 
since we first brought up the network.”  He also stated that, 
“there is a second set of documentation that we prepared in 
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response to a TRAC audit that we did in 2008,” adding that, 
“it's [TRAC] very good at crystallizing and condensing 
down what things you should be documenting and it gives 
you a good base in my experience for defining and making 
sure that your practices are as sophisticated as they need to 
be in order to guarantee that you're doing digital 
preservation . . . the disaster recovery piece is a perfect 
example because that document and the succession 
planning document those have come out of that TRAC 
experience, not because we hadn't already thought through 
those things and had them documented in other ways, we 
did not have one document that said 'this focuses 
completely on that topic' and that, the importance of that, 
was highlighted in the TRAC document and I think 
rightfully so.  It helped to motivate us.”   
Staff from the repositories without official certification 
claimed to have disaster planning policies and procedures in 
place. Yet, they did not have formal disaster planning 
documentation.  The Internet Archive, MATRIX, and the 
National Library of Australia fell into this category.  
Interviewees from each of these organizations explained 
that while policies and procedures existed, they had not 
found the need to create formal disaster planning 
documentation.  Subject F from MATRIX stated that, “we 
have practices and we have some documentation in 
different locations that more or less equate to that [disaster 
planning] but we don't have a direct formal plan that speaks 
to exactly what we'll do in the event of a disaster.”    
Among the repositories included in this study, ICPSR was 
the only organization to create a full suite of formal disaster 
planning documentation independent of any audit or 
certification process, although they later applied for and 
received a Data Seal of Approval. Subject E explained that 
the development of disaster response and recovery policies 
and procedures was a result of organizational growth and 
development, “I think it was just a general sense of 
alignment with good practice . . . there was a sense that we 
need some kind of disaster planning in place.”   
Disaster Response and Recovery Plan Documentation 
All of the interviewees stated that their organization had 
some form of disaster planning documentation.  Many 
provided evidence of that documentation in the form of an 
audit report, but only ICPSR and HathiTrust were able or 
willing to discuss these plans in detail or to provide copies 
of their complete documentation.  This is significant in part 
because one of the key tenets of trustworthy digital 
repositories is transparency (Consultative Committee for 
Space Data Systems, 2012).  A repository that does not 
make key documentation available for review is arguably 
not transparent. That said, we acknowledge that some 
disaster planning documentation needs to be confidential 
for security reasons.   
Both interviewees from Chronopolis explained that the 
organization’s disaster planning documentation was created 
in response to the recent TRAC audit.  “In general terms we 
created a TRAC report which basically follows the question 
and answer schema of the TRAC audit itself” (Subject A).  
But upon further discussion, Subject B revealed that the 
Chronopolis disaster plan primarily serves to point users to 
other disaster planning documents, “we do have a document 
that is Chronopolis’ disaster planning, but all the 
instructions for that disaster planning link out to other 
places.”  Specifically, “Chronopolis is a consortium of three 
institutions . . . and each of those entities has a specific 
disaster plan for what happens to data in their data centers.  
And so we rely on those disaster plans in those data centers 
to make up the whole disaster plan for Chronopolis.”  
Subject B discovered while reviewing documentation 
during our interview that, “it's just a statement, we don't 
actually link out to the other institutions.”  Meaning, the 
information that is available to the public references other 
documents but does not provide links to those documents.  
In the words of Subject B, “they're actually difficult to find.  
So yes, they're available to the public - but they're available 
if you can find them.”  The interviewee explained that he 
was actually unable to find the documents without 
assistance from the individual responsible for them at the 
partner institution. 
In an interesting exchange, Subject F (a technologist from 
MATRIX) explained that a formal disaster plan is not 
needed because the steps required to recover from a disaster 
event are so obvious and simple that any competent System 
Administrator would understand how to carry out this 
action.  “We have a wiki and we've been putting a lot of our 
documentation on that.  And we do have a lot of our 
documents regarding how to bring the system back up, and 
what our plans are, and what our procedures are.  They're 
not in one actual spot on the wiki yet but we're getting to 
that point, and really part of the decision to make with us is 
do we focus on documenting more or less a known 
procedure . . . most Sys Admins would understand ‘ok 
there's a tape backup, take the tape backup and restore it’ 
and now you're good to go more or less.  I mean if at worst 
case someone hopefully would know to put a tape in the 
drive, right?  It’s common sense . . . at that point it's really a 
question of to what level of detail do we get . . . but 
documentation we haven't really focused on a lot just 
because of the fact that we're not at a point where we're 
complex enough to require it in my opinion.”  This is an 
opinion that was not expressed by any other subject in this 
study, and which may be a result of the fact that this subject 
was in a role with an IT function rather than a role with a 
preservation function.  As will be discussed later, many 
interviewees discussed having difficulty in getting proper 
documentation from the IT departments within their 
respective organizations.  This discussion perhaps provides 
some insight to the other side of that frustration. 
Subject J from The MetaArchive Cooperative explained 
that, “we have documented contingency plans that look at a 
number of different points on the axis of problems that 
could erupt and what would happen in those kinds of 
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disaster scenarios” and also that, “there is a contingency 
piece for each one of our member institutions that is part of 
their own disaster planning so there are these two layers to 
disaster planning as we see it at MetaArchive.”  In this case, 
there are multiple components to the disaster 
documentation.  Subject J goes on to explain that “in terms 
of documentation, it started with our membership 
agreement and our charter and those two core documents 
are the legal underpinnings for the relationships that 
comprise the MetaArchive network” as well as “a second 
set of documentation that we prepared in response to a 
TRAC audit that we did in 2008 that [resulted in] a 
formalized contingency plan document and succession 
plan.”  In this case, the interviewee was able to discuss and 
describe several types of documents, but again specific 
disaster planning policies and procedures were not 
available. 
The staff of Portico has created several different documents 
that comprise their disaster planning documentation, “our 
policies are very targeted, so we don't have one big 
overarching policy for Portico.  We have a series of smaller 
policies . . . so at Portico we've got 13, 16, 21 different 
policies . . . I would say that there are probably three 
policies that are directly impacting disaster recovery” 
(Subject H).  This interview also revealed that, “we have 
two sets [of disaster planning documents].  There is the set 
that is maintained by our IT group . . . they have a set of 
disaster recover policies that they have developed that 
involves a lot of this infrastructure type stuff.  Portico 
proper has a set of group preservation policies around 
disaster recovery, which specify the number of backups we 
need to have the number of replicas where they're going to 
be located, our general philosophy about it.”  Much like the 
interviewee from MATRIX, Subject H from Portico seemed 
to be describing a disconnect between the IT and 
Preservation functions within the organization.  Rather than 
having one set of combined disaster planning documents, 
Portico had two separate sets of documents that were not 
combined in any formal or significant way.  In fact, the 
interviewee was able to discuss the IT documents in only 
broad strokes. 
The interviewees from HathiTrust were totally open in 
terms of sharing their documentation and work in progress.  
As Subject C stated, “it’s in progress right now.  We have a 
foundational outline that we’re working from” and “it’s not 
a functional recovery plan by any means but the goal is to 
get to that.”  This discussion reinforced the idea that the 
policies and procedures needed for actual disaster response 
and recovery were in place, and that the creation of formal 
disaster planning documentation was a formality, “a lot of 
the proper thinking has been done in very many ways and 
the proper work has been done to ensure that things will 
likely function very smoothly in the event of a disaster, but 
the work has not been done to fully articulate the processes 
in which it will take place.” 
The interviewee from ICPSR was also completely open 
about sharing her disaster documentation.   “We follow the 
NIST model for the types of documents.  So it's a suite of 
documents it's not a single thing.  It's ongoing, it's a 
planning process, the focus is on planning as a verb, not 
plan as a noun” (Subject E).  Nearly all ICPSR 
documentation was available via the disaster planning 
section on the organization’s website, and the individual 
interviewed was able to share the remaining documents via 
email. 
The staff of the Internet Archive (IA) have, “an internal 
checklist absolutely which we review” that is maintained by 
an IT department.  However, IA staff do not consider the 
checklist to be a complete disaster response and recovery 
plan.  It is also not available to the public.  Subject I in this 
case was either unwilling or unable to discuss specifics of 
this plan.  Subject G from the National Library of Australia 
expressed a similar situation, “we have a digital 
preservation section, and we have a very large IT section, 
and the IT section deals with a lot of the things like backups 
. . . and so as much as I could say to you 'yes we do have a 
backup regime' I can't give you the exact details of it 
because they run those kind of things.”  The disconnect 
between the preservation and IT functions at this 
organization was so great that the digital preservation 
section staff were not familiar with the disaster planning 
documentation at all. 
Process of Creation of a Disaster Response and 
Recovery Plan, Including Obstacles 
The majority of interviewees included in this study reported 
significant obstacles or challenges encountered in the 
process of creating their disaster response and recovery 
planning documentation. Common themes included 
organizational obstacles, such as the difficulty of getting 
buy-in from other internal members of the organization, in 
particular difficulty collaborating and communicating with 
the IT department, and the amount of time required for 
completion of the documentation.  These obstacles align 
with the earlier finding that most repositories with 
formalized disaster planning documentation created that 
documentation as the result of an audit. 
Several of the interviewees discussed the difficulty of 
creating disaster planning documentation while 
experiencing resistance from other members of their 
organizations. For example, Subject A described the 
process of creating the disaster planning documentation as 
“herding cats.”  He went on to say that the most significant 
barrier to completing the disaster planning documentation 
prior to the TRAC audit “probably would have been not 
having a big enough stick to force people to do it . . . in 
order to get detailed documents it really did take the audit 
to pull those things out.”   
Subject E from ICPSR, the only organization in this study 
with staff who created detailed disaster planning 
documentation independent of an audit, focused on the 
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problems of organizational cooperation and difficulty 
coordinating with the IT department.  Subject E began with 
discussion of the historical resistance to formal disaster 
planning activities, “in the past I think that it was often 
looked at as a luxury . . . it’s a natural human thing to not 
want to talk about a disaster until the disaster is there and 
then be caught short because you don’t have any planning 
in place.”  In order to overcome this resistance, it was 
necessary to get buy-in from senior members of the 
organization, members who were initially unwilling to 
devote their time or that of their subordinates to the process. 
“Part of the difficulty of engaging in roles and 
responsibilities is that they have to at least start at the 
highest levels of the organization.  They view it as costly 
they view it as a distraction, but you can't work at the 
bottom when you're dealing with decision making and 
actual authority.”  Staff of ICPSR also experienced 
difficulty in “parsing out the IT piece . . . because when you 
have IT as an integral part of your organization and your 
organization is committed to lifecycle management, there is 
this ‘now’ and ‘future’ and the people who are doing these 
things don't often distinguish between the hats that they 
have.  It was hard to get them to focus on the different parts 
. . . we have a really good IT group, but it's also a challenge 
for digital preservation.” 
Collaboration with the IT department was an obstacle 
identified by several interviewees.  Subject G described a 
great deal of difficulty in working with the IT section of the 
organization, including difficulty convincing them that 
digital preservation and disaster planning are valid or 
necessary.  Conversely, Subject F explained the decision 
not to create formal disaster planning documentation in the 
following way, “most System Administrators would 
understand ‘ok there's a tape backup, take the tape backup 
and restore it’ and now you're good to go more or less.  I 
mean if at worst case someone hopefully would know to put 
a tape in the drive, right?  It’s common sense.”  These two 
sides of the same issue illustrate the difference in 
perspective between the preservation and IT functions 
within these repositories.   
Subject E from ICPSR described a series of drills that the 
repository staff ran in order to test their disaster recovery 
capabilities.  They found that they were able to recover a 
full copy of the repository’s data from backup, but that it 
was more difficult and took significantly more time than 
they had expected.  “We have done a complete – we have 
six copies online and then one copy on a tape – and we 
have actually, as part of … the fire drill we did and it 
actually took longer than they thought which was exactly 
why I wanted to do it but they were actually able to 
reconstitute all of the stored files from the tape backup to 
demonstrate that they could.” 
The amount of time needed to produce formal disaster 
planning documentation was identified as another 
significant obstacle.  Interviewees from organizations both 
with and without formal documentation in place discussed 
this challenge extensively.  “I'm interested in seeing the 
cost/benefit analysis of how much time does it take, how 
much effort went into the creation of 'x' part of the 
document vs. how useful that part of the document would 
even be in terms of disaster recovery process” (Subject D). 
All of the repositories that have been through some type of 
audit described the process as being time consuming.  
According to Subject H, “I would say that it was probably a 
six month process for us . . . to really formalize and finalize 
a relatively substantial set of our preservation policies, 
disaster recovery being one element of that the whole 
process . . . it was actually quite a chunk of time with 
participation from three or four people.  It was not an easy 
process.”  For Chronopolis, Subject A explained that the 
creation of formal disaster planning documentation took “a 
good three to four months” to complete, and “was one of 
the more significant sections that we had to do a lot of new 
work for . . . it's probably one of the larger sections for us in 
terms of how much time was spent on it.”   
The process of creating formal disaster planning 
documentation was described by most subjects as time 
consuming and difficult, despite the claim by most 
interviewees in this study that creating formal disaster 
planning documentation was merely a process of 
documenting current practices.  For The MetaArchive 
Cooperative, “at least 80 hours of people time went into the 
drafting.  Not the approval process, not the continued 
revisions that we're still doing, but just the base-level 
drafting to really get all of this done and lined up . . . at 
least 80 hours.” 
DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss the three main findings of this 
study in greater detail.  The three major findings of this 
study address:  
1. The incentive that certification provides for 
disaster planning.  
 
2. The lack of transparency in digital disaster 
planning. 
 
3. The need for Coordination between the IT and 
preservation functions. 
For most organizations, the process of going through an 
audit for certification as a trusted repository provided 
diverse staff with an incentive to allocate time to create 
formalized disaster planning documentation. Organizations 
that have been through an audit process were more likely to 
have formal disaster planning documentation in place.  
Interviewees from these organizations discussed the role 
that the audit played in providing widespread organizational 
motivation to complete this documentation, and discussed 
the challenges that had prevented them from completing 
this documentation previously.  Central to this was the idea 
that until the organization was provided with a suitably 
attractive incentive, such as the need for certification, it was 
difficult or impossible to convince staff in other functional 
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areas, such as IT and Administration, to spend time 
documenting policies and procedures that were not formally 
documented or perhaps even articulated elsewhere or were 
just tacitly understood. 
These findings suggest that one of the primary benefits of 
achieving trusted digital repository status, in addition to 
certification itself, is the fact that it provides an opportunity 
for organizational members to enter into a dialog about 
disaster prevention and recovery and an incentive for the 
entire organization to create accurate, up-to-date, thorough 
documentation of policies and procedures.  For 
organizations that already have some form of 
documentation in place, the audit provides the organization 
with an opportunity to improve and update their 
documentation.   
Repositories struggle with the decision to make disaster 
planning documentation available to the general public.  
We expected that repositories that had been through an 
audit for certification would be willing to make at least 
parts of their disaster planning documentation publicly 
available, perhaps with some restrictions due to sensitive 
security-related information.  Given that transparency is one 
of the value principles of TRAC, it seemed natural that 
TRAC certified repositories would then make at least parts 
of their documentation available to the public.  As we 
discovered, this was generally not the case.  The availability 
of documentation regarding disaster planning activities 
varied widely among repositories and ran the full spectrum 
from fully available to completely restricted.   
Finally, we found that the single greatest obstacle to 
disaster planning activities at all stages of the process was 
coordination, or lack of coordination, between the IT and 
preservation functions within an organization.  Subjects in 
preservation and administration roles expressed frustration 
with the lack of communication and cooperation from the 
IT departments in their organizations.  Subjects in IT 
functions expressed a belief that formal disaster planning 
activities were unnecessary and a poor use of time and 
resources for the organization.  IT staff viewed their tacit 
understanding and procedures as sufficient. Other staff 
wanted greater articulation of those procedures and 
transparency in policies. 
We also saw that a greater degree of communication and 
cooperation is needed between preservation and IT 
functions within digital repositories.  A consistent pattern in 
the interviews was the difficulty in working with IT, and 
the resistance of that group to participate in formal disaster 
planning documentation efforts.  Conversely, this problem 
can be seen as a shortcoming on the part of digital 
preservation policy makers.  Perhaps an opportunity for 
education and better communication exists between the 
different functions.  While the IT function seems to almost 
universally have been an obstacle to disaster planning 
efforts in the repositories in this study, interviewees also 
stated that this seems to be a case of individuals in the IT 
role not having the same understanding of and appreciation 
for disaster planning.  Those in the field of digital 
preservation need to find ways of communicating with 
those in IT in order to improve collaboration and 
coordination throughout the organization to address the 
management of digital assets. 
The initial research question for this study focused on 
investigating how repositories engage in disaster planning 
activities. After examining the practices of several well-
respected digital repositories, it has become clear that one 
of the reasons that so few studies have been conducted in 
this area is that digital repositories, until recently, did not 
have formal documentation regarding their disaster 
planning efforts.  It has also become clear that it is not 
possible to gain a full understanding of the disaster 
planning efforts of an organization if those efforts are not 
codified and made available for review.  The fact that only 
two of the eight repositories were able or willing to make 
their full disaster planning documentation publicly available 
was a major limitation for this study.  Additionally, this 
lack of transparency may be hampering disaster planning 
efforts in the community as few models of the 
documentation or the disaster planning process are 
available for review. 
CONCLUSION 
This study found that while repositories are engaging in 
disaster planning activities, they are doing so largely as a 
means to obtain trusted digital repository status.  
Furthermore, repositories are reluctant or unwilling to share 
their disaster planning documentation.  This suggests that 
while one of the key elements of certification programs for 
digital repositories is the creation of formalized 
documentation of policies and procedures, these are not 
benefitting the community as much as they could.  Since 
transparency is a core tenet of TRAC, auditors should insist 
that trusted digital repositories share some disaster planning 
documentation and make non-sensitive policies and 
procedures available to the public in order to meet the 
criteria for trusted repository status, or to include the 
repository’s documentation in the final audit report 
demonstrating that they have met the criteria for 
certification.   
None of the repositories included in this study have had the 
opportunity to use their disaster planning documentation.  
In an article on disaster preparedness, Schmidt observes 
that, “given enough time, the likelihood of a major disaster 
at an institution becomes a near certainty” (Schmidt, 2010).   
While one hopes that these organizations will never have 
the need for their use, this suggests that they will, and an 
opportunity for future research exists in the implementation 
and use of these documents.   
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank Dr. Paul Conway and Shannon 
Zachary for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
9 
REFERENCES 
Aikin, J. (2007). Preparing for a National Emergency: The 
Committee on Conservation of Cultural Resources, 
1939-1944. The Library Quarterly, 77(3), 257. 
Altman, M., Adams, M., Crabtree, J., Donakowski, D., 
Maynard, M., Pienta, A., & Young, C. (2009). 
Digital Preservation Through Archival 
Collaboration: The Data Preservation Alliance for 
the Social Sciences. The American Archivist, 
72(1), 170–184. 
Anderson, C. (2005). Digital Preservation: Will Your Files 
Stand the Test of Time? Library Hi Tech News, 
22(6), 9–10. 
Babbie, E. R. (2010). The Practice of Social Research. 
Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Cengage. 
Ball, A. (2010). Review of the State of the Art of the Digital 
Curation of Research Data (ERIM Project 
Document erim1rep091103ab11 No. version 1.1) 




Beagrie, N., Chruszcz, J., & Lavoie, B. (2008). Keeping 
Research Data Safe. JISC. Retrieved from 
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/publications/reports/2008/ke
epingresearchdatasafe.aspx 
Berman, F. (2008). Got Data?: A Guide to Data 
Preservation in the Information Age. 
Communications of the ACM, 51(12), 50–56. 
doi:10.1145/1409360.1409376 
Center for Research Libraries. (2007). Ten Principles. 
Center for Research Libraries Global Resources 
Network. Retrieved October 9, 2012, from 
http://www.crl.edu/archiving-preservation/digital-
archives/metrics-assessing-and-certifying/core-re 
Cervone, H. F. (2006). Disaster Recovery and Continuity 
Planning for Digital Library Systems. OCLC 
Systems & Services: International Digital Library 
Perspectives, 22(3), 173. 
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems. (2012). 
Space Data and Information Transfer Systems — 
Audit and Certification of Trustworthy Digital 
Repositories (Standard No. ISO 16363:2012 
(CCSDS 652-R-1)). Washington, D.C.: 
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems.  
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems. (2012). 
Reference Model for and Open Archival 
Information System (OAIS) (Magenta Book No. 
CCSDS 650.0-M-2). Washington, D.C.: 
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems. 
Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS). (2010). 
Data Seal of Approval: Quality Guidelines for 
Digital Research Data. The Hague. Retrieved 
from http://www.datasealofapproval.org/?q=about 
Data Intensive Cyber Environments Group. (2008). iRODS: 
Integrated Rule Oriented Data System (White 
Paper). Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of California at 
San Diego. 
Dobratz, S., Schoger, A., & Strathmann, S. (2007). The 
nestor Catalogue of Criteria for Trusted Digital 
Repository Evaluation and Certification. The 
Journal of Digital Information, 8(2). Retrieved 
from  
Garrett, J., & Waters, D. J. (1996). Preserving Digital 
Information: Report of the Task Force on 
Archiving of Digital Information (No. 
9781887334501 1887334505) (p. 68). 
Washington, D.C.: The Commission on 
Preservation and Access & Research Libraries 
Group.  
Gracy, K. F., & Kahn, M. B. (2012). Preservation in the 
Digital Age. Library Resources & Technical 
Services, 56(1), 25–43. 
Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social 
Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley Pub. Co.  
Innocenti, P., & Vullo, G. (2009). Assessing the 
Preservation of Institutional Repositories with 
DRAMBORA: Case Studies from the University 
of Glasgow. Bollettino AIB, 49(2), 139–158. 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR). (2013). Disaster Planning. 
ICPSR Data Management: Disaster Planning. 
Retrieved April 1, 2013, from 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/data
management/disaster/ 
Maniatis, P., Roussopoulos, M., Giuli, T. J., Rosenthal, D. 
S. H., & Baker, M. (2005). The LOCKSS Peer-to-
Peer Digital Preservation System. ACM 
Transactions on Computing Systems, 23(1), 2–50. 
doi:10.1145/1047915.1047917 
McDonald, R. H., & Walters, T. O. (2010). Restoring Trust 
Relationships within the Framework of 
Collaborative Digital Preservation Federations. 
Journal of Digital Information, 11(1).  
McHugh, A., Ross, S., Innocenti, P., Ruusalepp, R., & 
Hoffman, H. (2008). Bringng Self-Assessment 
Home: Repository Profiling and Key Lines of 
Enquiry within DRAMBORA. The International 
Journal of Digital Curation, 3(2), 130–142. 
doi:doi:10.2218/ijdc.v3i2.64 
Muir, A., & Shenton, S. (2002). If the Worst Happens: The 
Use and Effectiveness of Disaster Plans in 
 
10 
Libraries and Archives. Library Management, 
23(3), 115–123. 
Myles, B. (2000). The Impact of a Library Flood on 
Computer Operations. Computers in Libraries, 
20(1), 44–44–46. 
Nestor Working Group Trusted Repositories - Certification. 
(2009). nestor Criteria: Catalogue of Criteria for 
Trusted Digital Repositories, Version 2. Frankfurt 
am Main: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.  
Patel, M. C. (2007). A Study of Curation and Preservation 
Issues in the eCrystals Data Reository and 
Proposed Federation (Final Version (Revised) No. 
eBank-UK Phase 3: WP4) (pp. 1–34). Bath: 
UKOLN, DCC; National Crystallography Centre. 
Rajasekar, A., Moore, R., Hou, C.-Y., Lee, C. A., 
Marciano, R., de Torcy, A., … Zhu, B. (2010). 
iRODS Primer: Integrated Rule-Oriented Data 
System. Synthesis Lectures on Information 
Concepts, Retrieval, and Services, 2(1), 1–143. 
doi:10.2200/S00233ED1V01Y200912ICR012 
Robson, C. (1993). Real World Research: A Resource for 
Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers. 
Oxford, UK  ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.  
Ross, S., & McHugh, A. (2006). Preservation Pressure 
Points: Evaluating Diverse Evidence for Risk 
Management. Presented at the iPRES 2006, New 
York, NY: Digital Curation Centre. 
Schmidt, G. (2010). Web 2.0 for Disaster Response and 
Recovery. Journal of Web Librarianship, 4(4), 
413–426. doi:10.1080/19322909.2010.511038 
Skinner, R. E. (2006). “Nor Any Drop to Drink”: New 
Orleans Libraries in the Aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. Public Library Quarterly, 25(3-4), 179–
187. doi:10.1300/J118v25n03_15 
Wildemuth, B. M. (2009). Applications of Social Research 
Methods to Questions in Information and Library 
Science. Westport, Conn.: Libraries Unlimited.  
Wong, Y. L., & Green, R. (2006). Disaster Planning in 
Libraries. Journal of Access Services, 4(3/4), 71 – 
82. 
 
 
 
